Ethiopia After Meles
By the International Crisis Group (ICG) | Africa Briefing N°89
Aug 22, 2012
The death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who had not been seen in public for several months, was announced on 20 August 2012 by Ethiopian state television. The passing of the man who has been Ethiopia’s epicentre for 21 years will have profound national and regional consequences. Meles engineered one-party rule in effect for the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and his Tigrayan inner circle, with the complicity of other ethnic elites that were co-opted into the ruling alliance, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The Front promised freedom, democracy and ethnic devolution but is highly centralised, tightly controls the economy and suppresses political, social, ethnic and religious liberties. In recent years, Meles had relied ever more on repression to quell growing dissent. His successor will lead a weaker regime that struggles to manage increasing unrest unless it truly implements ethnic federalism and institutes fundamental governance reform. The international community should seek to influence the transition actively because it has a major interest in the country’s stability.
Despite his authoritarianism and poor human rights records, Meles became an important asset to the international community, a staunch Western ally in counter-terrorism efforts in the region and a valued development partner for Western and emerging powers. In consequence, Ethiopia has become the biggest aid recipient in Africa, though Meles’s government was only able to partially stabilise either the country or region.
Ethiopia’s political system and society have grown increasingly unstable largely because the TPLF has become increasingly repressive, while failing to implement the policy of ethnic federalism it devised over twenty years ago to accommodate the land’s varied ethnic identities. The result has been greater political centralisation, with concomitant ethnicisation of grievances. The closure of political space has removed any legitimate means for people to channel those grievances. The government has encroached on social expression and curbed journalists, non-governmental organisations and religious freedoms. The cumulative effect is growing popular discontent, as well as radicalisation along religious and ethnic lines. Meles adroitly navigated a number of internal crises and kept TPLF factions under his tight control. Without him, however, the weaknesses of the regime he built will be more starkly exposed.
The transition will likely be an all-TPLF affair, even if masked beneath the constitution, the umbrella of the EPRDF and the prompt elevation of the deputy prime minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, to acting head of government. Given the opacity of the inner workings of the government and army, it is impossible to say exactly what it will look like and who will end up in charge. Nonetheless, any likely outcome suggests a much weaker government, a more influential security apparatus and endangered internal stability. The political opposition, largely forced into exile by Meles, will remain too fragmented and feeble to play a considerable role, unless brought on board in an internationally-brokered process. The weakened Tigrayan elite, confronted with the nation’s ethnic and religious cleavages, will be forced to rely on greater repression if it is to maintain power and control over other ethnic elites. Ethno-religious divisions and social unrest are likely to present genuine threats to the state’s long-term stability and cohesion.
The regional implications will be enormous. Increasing internal instability could threaten the viability of Ethiopia’s military interventions in Somalia and Sudan, exacerbate tensions with Eritrea, and, more broadly, put in question its role as the West’s key regional counter-terrorism ally. Should religious or ethnic radicalisation grow, it could well spill across borders and link with other armed radical Islamic groups.
The international community, particularly Ethiopia’s core allies, the U.S., UK and European Union (EU), should accordingly seek to play a significant role in preparing for and shaping the transition, by:
- tying political, military and development assistance to the opening of political space and an end to repressive measures;
- encouraging the post-Meles leadership to produce a clear roadmap, including transparent mechanisms within the TPLF and the EPRDF for apportioning the party and Front power Meles held and within parliament to lead to an all-inclusive, peaceful transition, resulting in free and fair elections within a fixed time; and
- helping to revive the political opposition’s ability to represent its constituencies, in both Ethiopia and the diaspora.
Nairobi/Brussels, 22 August 2012
Ethiopian Succession Battle May Test Stability Of Key U.S. Ally
By William Davison – Aug 21,
Aug 22, 2012 (bloomberg) – Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s death may cause a succession battle that could test the stability of one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies and a key ally in the U.S.’s war against al-Qaeda.
The 57-year-old premier died Aug. 20 from an infection after recuperating at a hospital in an undisclosed location from an unspecified illness. Deputy Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn is serving as acting prime minister.
Competition to succeed Meles may fracture the unity of the ruling Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front and embolden opposition groups frustrated by years of government suppression, said analysts including Jennifer Cooke, director of the Africa Program at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies. That may jeopardize a state-driven program that generated average economic growth of 11 percent over the past seven years, while placing at risk Ethiopia’s role as a peacekeeper in the Horn of Africa region.
“Meles has played such an outsized role in the country’s leadership that there’s no obvious successor or power broker within the EPRDF who will now take firm charge,” Cooke said in an e-mailed response to questions yesterday.
Meles’s administration mixed government spending on infrastructure like roads and hydropower plants with investment by companies including Amsterdam-based Heineken NV (HEIA), the world’s third-biggest brewer, and those owned by Saudi billionaire Mohamed al-Amoudi to spur the economy. Growth in Africa’s biggest coffee-producing nation may slow to 6.5 percent in 2013 from 7 percent this year amid the global economic slowdown, according to theInternational Monetary Fund.
Ethiopia under Meles also benefited economically from its partnership with Western allies on security issues. It’s helped fight insurgencies in Somalia, where Meles sent troops for the second time in December to help drive out al-Qaeda-linked militants, and its forces patrol Abyei, which is claimed by both Sudan and South Sudan. In 2011, the country was Africa’s biggest recipient of foreign aid, totaling $3.53 billion, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Meles came to power after building a coalition of rebel groups to overthrow Mengistu Haile Mariam’s Marxist military junta in 1991. Since then he has consolidated power by purging potential rivals and promoting those loyal to him. He also strengthened the authority of the ruling party by cracking down on opposition parties and using counter-terrorism legislation to jail reporters and dissenters.
“The current government’s suppression of any kind of democratic process or debate means that there are significant tensions and resentments within the country that have had no outlet or expression,” Cooke said. “If the ruling coalition is distracted or weakened by infighting, opposition parties will see an opportunity to press their case.”
Potential successors in addition to Hailemariam include the State Minister for Foreign Affairs Berhane Gebrekristos from Meles’s Tigray People’s Liberation Front, or TPLF; Amhara Regional State President Ayalew Gobeze; and Health Minister Tewodros Adhanom Gebreyesus, who is a TPLF executive committee member, said Terrence Lyons, associate professor of conflict resolution at George Mason University in Virginia.
The TPLF forms the core of the EPRDF coalition, which in 1994 ushered in a constitution that divided Ethiopia into nine ethnically based federal regions and two autonomous cities. Besides the TPLF, the Oromo and Amhara communities and a grouping of smaller ethnic communities from the country’s south each have parties in the coalition. The Oromo make up 35 percent of Ethiopia’s population, the Amhara 27 percent and the Tigray 6 percent, according to the U.S. State Department.
Hailemariam was Meles’s chosen successor, Seeye Abraha, a former executive committee member of the TPLF, turned political opponent, said in an e-mailed response to questions. Hailemariam is deputy chairman of the EPRDF that along with its allies controls all but two of the seats in the nation’s 547-seat parliament. He is a Wolayta, one of three main ethnic groups in the politically fragmented southern region.
Hailemariam may not “wield much power” because officials from the TPLF will retain control of the security services and key ministries, said Michael Woldemariam, an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at Boston University in Massachusetts.
Seeye, who served as defense minister from 1991 to 1995, was one of 12 individuals purged from the TPLF leadership in 2001 after criticizing Meles for perceived weaknesses in his handling of a two-year border war with Eritrea that ended in 2000 and cost 70,000 lives.
The next leader will “have to come from outside the TPLF” because of Tigrayans’ minority status, former U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia David Shinn said in an e-mailed response to questions. “It is simply smart politics for the EPRDF to share the top spot.”
“Instability may occur if new splits emerge within the TPLF,” Woldemariam said in an e-mailed response to questions yesterday. “If the TPLF can retain its unity and integrity, then I think a slide into instability is unlikely. A split in its upper echelons would likely infect the EPRDF’s other coalition partners as TPLF factions vie for support.”
A rupture in the Tigrayan group may also cause unrest in the security services it controls, he said.
Several insurgent groups operate in Ethiopia, including the banned Oromo Liberation Front, which withdrew from the government in 1993, and the Ogaden National Liberation Front that fights for more autonomy for the ethnic-Somali Ogadeni people.
Over the past 10 months, the government has also faced demonstrations by Muslims against government interference in their community in Addis Ababa and other towns. About a third of Ethiopia’s 94 million people are Muslim, according to the CIA World Factbook.
The regional importance of Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous nation, in fighting al-Qaeda makes the U.S. “deeply concerned at the prospect of a destabilizing or uncertain transition in Ethiopia,” Cooke said.
Ethiopia received $6.23 billion in assistance from the U.S. between 2000 and 2011, according to the State Department.